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Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity

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Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

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Abstract

There are many different aspects of election procedures that might be studied. In general we might be concerned with the procedure by which an election will be held, the fairness of the procedure toward candidates, and the consideration of how well the procedure does at selecting the candidate who best reflects the preferences of the voters. Fishburn (1983) presents a survey of research that deals with these issues in some detail. The aspects of elections that are considered are: the nomination process, agenda formation, candidate strategy, voter psychology and strategy, ballot forms and method of aggregation, evaluative aspects of aggregation, incentive compatibility, costs and financing, and institutional effects. Richelson (1975, 1978a, b, 1979, 1980, 1981), Nurmi (1983) and Tideman (2006) all present analyses that evaluate voting rules according to a number of different criteria, including the Condorcet Criterion. Bordley (1983, 1985) presents simulation studies to evaluate voting rules on a number of criteria other than the Condorcet Criterion. There are clearly many different criteria by which voting rules can be evaluated.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business Administration Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics, University of Delaware, 303 Alfred Lerner Hall, Newark, Delaware, 19716, USA

    Professor William V. Gehrlein

  2. Faculté de Droit et d’Economie, Université de La Réunion, 15, avenue René Cassin BP 7151, 97715, Saint-Denis Messag Cedex 9, Ile de La Réunion, FRANCE

    Professor Dominique Lepelley

Authors
  1. Professor William V. Gehrlein
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  2. Professor Dominique Lepelley
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Correspondence to William V. Gehrlein .

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Gehrlein, W.V., Lepelley, D. (2011). Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity. In: Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_5

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03106-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-03107-6

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