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Computing Knowledge in Security Protocols under Convergent Equational Theories

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 5663))

Abstract

In the symbolic analysis of security protocols, two classical notions of knowledge, deducibility and indistinguishability, yield corresponding decision problems. We propose a procedure for both problems under arbitrary convergent equational theories. Our procedure terminates on a wide range of equational theories. In particular, we obtain a new decidability result for a theory we encountered when studying electronic voting protocols. We also provide a prototype implementation.

This work has been partly supported by the ANR SeSur AVOTÉ.

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Ciobâcă, Ş., Delaune, S., Kremer, S. (2009). Computing Knowledge in Security Protocols under Convergent Equational Theories. In: Schmidt, R.A. (eds) Automated Deduction – CADE-22. CADE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5663. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02959-2_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02959-2_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02958-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02959-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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