Abstract
The absence of information on the state of the resource is considered as one of the main reasons of resource collapses. In the current study, we propose a solution to this problem stemming from the resource users. They can perceive the resource dynamics by the impact it has on their profits. At a given time step, the state of the resource depends on its previous states and hence on the agents’ past decisions. In this perspective, different perceptions are characterized by different weights that the resource users assign to the current and past actions in the profit formation. In order to capture these individual differences, we consider Schaefer-Gordon dynamic model. On its basis, we develop a learning model, adapted from Roth-Erev model. The simulation results show that the resource can be exploited in a sustainable manner if the past action is taken into account.
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Udumyan, N., Rouchier, J., Ami, D. (2009). An Attempt to Integrate Path-Dependency in a Learning Model. In: Hernández, C., Posada, M., López-Paredes, A. (eds) Artificial Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 631. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02956-1_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02956-1_18
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