Skip to main content

On a Network Generalization of the Minmax Theorem

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5556))

Abstract

We consider graphical games in which the edges are zero-sum games between the endpoints/players; the payoff of a player is the sum of the payoffs from each incident edge. Such games are arguably very broad and useful models of networked economic interactions. We give a simple reduction of such games to two-person zero-sum games; as a corollary, a mixed Nash equilibrium can be computed efficiently by solving a linear program and rounding off the results. Our results render polynomially efficient, and simplify considerably, the approach in [3].

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Adler, I., Daskalakis, C., Papadimitriou, C.H. (manuscript, 2009)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Aumann, R.J.: Game Theory. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds.) The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Macmillan & Co., London (1987)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Bregman, L.M., Fokin, I.N.: On Separable Non-Cooperative Zero-Sum Games. Optimization 44(1), 69–84 (1998)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Daskalakis, C., Goldberg, P.W., Papadimitriou, C.H.: The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium. In: STOC (2006); SIAM Journal on Computing, special issue for STOC 2006 (to appear)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Freund, Y., Schapire, R.E.: Adaptive Game Playing Using Multiplicative Weights. Games and Economic Behavior 29, 79–103 (1999)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  6. Kearns, M.J., Littman, M.L., Singh, S.P.: Graphical Models for Game Theory. In: UAI (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Kempe, D., Kleinberg, J., Tardos, É.: Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network. In: SIGKDD (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  8. von Neumann, J.: Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele. Math. Annalen 100, 295–320 (1928)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Daskalakis, C., Papadimitriou, C.H. (2009). On a Network Generalization of the Minmax Theorem. In: Albers, S., Marchetti-Spaccamela, A., Matias, Y., Nikoletseas, S., Thomas, W. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5556. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02930-1_35

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02930-1_35

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02929-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02930-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics