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Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting

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Handbook on Approval Voting

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

Abstract

This chapter reviews the experimental work about Approval Voting which follows the now standard practice of Experimental Economics. The principle of Experimental Economics is to observe individual behavior in situations where the experimenter can control individual preferences. The classical way to induce and control preferences is to use money, that is to pay the subjects more or less, depending on what they do and, in group experiments, what the other subjects do. This methodology has slowly gained popularity among the economists and is summarized in several classical references (for instance Davis and Holt 1993; Kagel and Roth 1995).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratoire d’ Econométrie, École Polytechnique, 91128, Palaiseau, France

    Jean-François Laslier

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  1. Jean-François Laslier
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Correspondence to Jean-François Laslier .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Labo. d'Econometrie, École Polytechnique, Palaiseau CX, 91128, France

    Jean-François Laslier

  2. Dept. Economics, Istanbul Bilgi University, Kurtulus Deresi Cad. 47, Istanbul, 34440, Turkey

    M. Remzi Sanver

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Laslier, JF. (2010). Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting. In: Laslier, JF., Sanver, M. (eds) Handbook on Approval Voting. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_14

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