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Computational Aspects of Approval Voting

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Handbook on Approval Voting

Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

Abstract

“Yes, we can!” – Barack Obama’s campaign slogan inspired enough of his supporters to go to the polls and give him their “yes” votes that he won the 2008 U.S. presidential election. And this happened notwithstanding the fact that many other voters said “no” when pollsters asked if they viewed Barack Obama as qualified for the office. “Yes” and “no” are perhaps the most basic ways for us, as voters, to express our preferences about candidates, and “yes” and “no” are what approval voting is all about.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Informatik, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, 40225, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Jörg Rothe

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  1. Dorothea Baumeister
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  2. Gábor Erdélyi
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  3. Edith Hemaspaandra
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  4. Lane A. Hemaspaandra
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  5. Jörg Rothe
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Correspondence to Jörg Rothe .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Labo. d'Econometrie, École Polytechnique, Palaiseau CX, 91128, France

    Jean-François Laslier

  2. Dept. Economics, Istanbul Bilgi University, Kurtulus Deresi Cad. 47, Istanbul, 34440, Turkey

    M. Remzi Sanver

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Baumeister, D., Erdélyi, G., Hemaspaandra, E., Hemaspaandra, L.A., Rothe, J. (2010). Computational Aspects of Approval Voting. In: Laslier, JF., Sanver, M. (eds) Handbook on Approval Voting. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_10

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