The Role of Anticipation on Cooperation and Coordination in Simulated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Playing
- 1k Downloads
We present a connectionist model for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game which we explored in different game-playing environments. The role of anticipation on cooperation and coordination was our main interest. The model was validated by comparisons with human subjects’ experiments in which subjects played individually against a computer opponent. After reproducing several interesting characteristics of individual play, we used the model in multi-agent simulations of small societies in which agents interacted among each-other by playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In genetic simulations, we demonstrated how anticipation will evolve in the societies to achieve either higher cooperation rates or payoffs. Our results favor the assumption that anticipation is decisive for high level of cooperation and higher cooperative coordination in the simulated societies.
KeywordsHide Unit Agent Society Cooperation Rate Game Outcome Current Game
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Ans, B., Rousset, S., French, R.M., Musca, S.: Preventing catastrophic interference in multiple- sequence learning using coupled reverberating elman networks. In: Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (2002)Google Scholar
- Brown, G.W.: Iterative solution of games by fictitious play. In: Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. Wiley, New York (1951)Google Scholar
- Camerer, C.F., Ho, T.-H.: Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: Estimates from Weak-Link Games, in Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon. Erlbaum, Hillsdale (1999)Google Scholar
- Colman, A.M.: Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction. Behavioral Brain Science 26, 139–153 (2003)Google Scholar
- Epstein, J.M., Axtell, R.: Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up. MIT Press, Cambridge (1996)Google Scholar
- Hristova, E., Grinberg, M.: Context effects on judgment scales in the prisoner’s dilemma game. In: sur Yvette, G. (ed.) Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Cognitive Economics (2004)Google Scholar
- Lalev, E., Grinberg, M.: Backward vs. forward-oriented decision making in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma: A comparison between two connectionist models. In: Butz, M.V., Sigaud, O., Pezzulo, G., Baldassarre, G. (eds.) ABiALS 2006. LNCS, vol. 4520, pp. 345–364. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Sutton, R.S., Barto, A.G.: An adaptive network that constructs and uses an internal model of its world. Cognition and Brain Theory (4), 217–246 (1981)Google Scholar