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The Role of Anticipation on Cooperation and Coordination in Simulated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Playing

  • Maurice Grinberg
  • Emilian Lalev
Conference paper
  • 1k Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5499)

Abstract

We present a connectionist model for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game which we explored in different game-playing environments. The role of anticipation on cooperation and coordination was our main interest. The model was validated by comparisons with human subjects’ experiments in which subjects played individually against a computer opponent. After reproducing several interesting characteristics of individual play, we used the model in multi-agent simulations of small societies in which agents interacted among each-other by playing the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In genetic simulations, we demonstrated how anticipation will evolve in the societies to achieve either higher cooperation rates or payoffs. Our results favor the assumption that anticipation is decisive for high level of cooperation and higher cooperative coordination in the simulated societies.

Keywords

Hide Unit Agent Society Cooperation Rate Game Outcome Current Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maurice Grinberg
    • 1
  • Emilian Lalev
    • 1
  1. 1.Central- and Eastern European Center for Cognitive ScienceSofiaBulgaria

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