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Security Weakness in a Provable Secure Authentication Protocol Given Forward Secure Session Key

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5593))

Abstract

Shi, Jang and Yoo recently proposed a provable secure key distribution and authentication protocol between user, service provider and key distribution center(KDC). The protocol was based on symmetric cryptosystem, challenge-response, Diffie-Hellman component and hash function. Despite the claim of provable security, the protocol is in fact insecure in the presence of an active adversary. In this paper, we present the imperfection of Shi et al.’s protocol and suggest modifications to the protocol which would resolve the problem.

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Kim, M., Jo, H., Kim, S., Won, D. (2009). Security Weakness in a Provable Secure Authentication Protocol Given Forward Secure Session Key. In: Gervasi, O., Taniar, D., Murgante, B., Laganà, A., Mun, Y., Gavrilova, M.L. (eds) Computational Science and Its Applications – ICCSA 2009. ICCSA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5593. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02457-3_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02457-3_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02456-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02457-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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