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Very-Efficient Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange and Its Extensions

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Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes (AAECC 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5527))

Abstract

An anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (anonymous PAKE) protocol is designed to provide both password-only authentication and user anonymity. In this paper, we propose a very-efficient anonymous PAKE (called, VEAP) protocol that provides the most efficiency among their kinds in terms of computation and communication costs. The VEAP protocol guarantees semantic security of session keys in the random oracle model under the chosen target CDH problem, and unconditional user anonymity against a semi-honest server. If the pre-computation is allowed, the computation cost of the VEAP protocol is the same as the well-known Diffie-Hellman protocol! In addition, we extend the VEAP protocol in two ways.

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Shin, S., Kobara, K., Imai, H. (2009). Very-Efficient Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange and Its Extensions. In: Bras-Amorós, M., Høholdt, T. (eds) Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes. AAECC 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5527. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02181-7_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02181-7_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-02180-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-02181-7

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