Abstract
Side-channel attacks are an important class of attacks against cryptographic devices and profiled side-channel attacks are the most powerful type of side-channel attacks. In this scenario, an adversary first uses a device under his control in order to build a good leakage model. Then, he takes advantage of this leakage model to exploit the actual leakages of a similar target device and perform a key recovery. Since such attacks are divided in two phases (namely profiling and online attack), the question of how to best evaluate those two phases arises. In this paper, we take advantage of a recently introduced framework for the analysis of side-channel attacks to tackle this issue. We show that the quality of a profiling phase is nicely captured by an information theoretic metric. By contrast, the effectiveness of the online key recovery phase is better measured with a security metric. As an illustration, we use this methodology to compare the two main techniques for profiled side-channel attacks, namely template attacks and stochastic models. Our results confirm the higher profiling efficiency of stochastic models when reasonable assumptions can be made about the leakages of a device.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Chari, S., Rao, J., Rohatgi, P.: Template Attacks. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 13–28. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Gierlichs, B., Lemke, K., Paar, C.: Templates vs. Stochastic Methods. In: Goubin, L., Matsui, M. (eds.) CHES 2006. LNCS, vol. 4249, pp. 15–29. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Lemke, K., Paar, C.: Analyzing Side-Channel Leakage of Masked Implementations with Stochastic Methods. In: Biskup, J., López, J. (eds.) ESORICS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4734, pp. 454–468. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Mangard, S., Oswald, E., Popp, T.: Power Analysis Attacks. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Schindler, W., Lemke, K., Paar, C.: A stochastic model for differential side channel cryptanalysis. In: Rao, J.R., Sunar, B. (eds.) CHES 2005. LNCS, vol. 3659, pp. 30–46. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Schindler, W.: Advanced Stochastic Methods in Side-Channel Analysis on Block Ciphers in the Presence of Masking. J. of Math. Cryptology 2, 291–310 (2008)
Standaert, F.-X., Malkin, T.G., Yung, M.: A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks. To appear in the proceedings of Eurocrypt (2009); Extended version available from: Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/139
Standaert, F.-X., Peeters, E., Archambeau, C., Quisquater, J.-J.: Towards Security Limits in Side-Channel Attacks. In: Goubin, L., Matsui, M. (eds.) CHES 2006. LNCS, vol. 4249, pp. 30–45. Springer, Heidelberg (2006), http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/222
Standaert, F.-X., Archambeau, C.: Using Subspace-Based Template Attacks to Compare and Combine Power and Electromagnetic Information Leakages. In: Oswald, E., Rohatgi, P. (eds.) CHES 2008. LNCS, vol. 5154, pp. 411–425. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Standaert, FX., Koeune, F., Schindler, W. (2009). How to Compare Profiled Side-Channel Attacks?. In: Abdalla, M., Pointcheval, D., Fouque, PA., Vergnaud, D. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5536. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01957-9_30
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01957-9_30
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-01956-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-01957-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)