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Integrity Protection for Revision Control

  • Christian Cachin
  • Martin Geisler
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5536)

Abstract

Users of online-collaboration tools and network storage services place considerable trust in their providers. This paper presents a novel approach for protecting data integrity in revision control systems hosted by an untrusted provider. It guarantees atomic read and write operations on the shared data when the service is correct and preserves fork-linearizability when the service is faulty. A prototype has been implemented on top of the Subversion revision control system; benchmarks show that the approach is practical.

Keywords

Hash trees memory checking fork linearizability storage security applied cryptography 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christian Cachin
    • 1
  • Martin Geisler
    • 2
  1. 1.Zurich Research LaboratoryIBM ResearchSwitzerland
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of AarhusDenmark

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