Algorithmic Tamper Proof (ATP) Counter Units for Authentication Devices Using PIN

  • Yuichi Komano
  • Kazuo Ohta
  • Hideyuki Miyake
  • Atsushi Shimbo
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5536)


Though Gennaro et al. discussed the algorithmic tamper proof (ATP) devices using the personal identification number (PIN) with less tamper-proof devices, and proposed counter units which count the number of wrong attempts in user authentication; however, as for the counter unit, they only constructed one which counts the total number of wrong attempts. Although large number for the limit of wrong attempts is required for usability, it allows an attacker to search PIN up to the limit and degrades the security. The construction of secure counter units which count the number of consecutive wrong attempts remains as an open problem. In this paper, we first formalize the ATP security of counter units, and propose two constructions of counter unit which count the number of consecutive wrong attempts. The security of each construction can be proven under the assumptions of secure signature scheme and random function. The former one is required to store two states in secure memory area (RP − Mem) with low computation cost; and the latter one has high computation cost but is required to store only one state in RP − Mem. This shows the trade-off between the costs of hardware and algorithm.


algorithmic tamper proof (ATP) counter unit PIN authentication 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yuichi Komano
    • 1
  • Kazuo Ohta
    • 2
  • Hideyuki Miyake
    • 1
  • Atsushi Shimbo
    • 1
  1. 1.Toshiba CorporationKawasakiJapan
  2. 2.The University of Electro-CommunicationsTokyoJapan

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