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Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games

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Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications (KES-AMSTA 2009)

Abstract

Cooperative boolean games are coalitional games with both goals and costs associated to actions, and dependence networks for boolean games are a kind of social networks representing how the actions of other agents have an influence on the achievement of an agent’s goal. In this paper, we introduce two new types of dependence networks, called the abstract dependence network and the refined dependence network. Moreover, we show that the notion of stability is complete with respect to the solution concept of the core in the case of cooperative boolean games with costly actions. We present a reduction, called Δ-reduction, to pass from a cooperative boolean game G to game G′ without loosing solutions.

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Sauro, L., van der Torre, L., Villata, S. (2009). Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games. In: Håkansson, A., Nguyen, N.T., Hartung, R.L., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications. KES-AMSTA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5559. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01665-3_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01665-3_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-01664-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-01665-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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