Abstract
Noninterference provides reliable guarantees for the confidentiality of sensitive information, but it is too restrictive if exceptions shall be permitted. Although many approaches to permitting and controlling exceptional information release have been proposed, the problem of declassification is not yet satisfactorily solved. The aim of our project is to provide adequate control for declassification in language-based security. The main contribution of this article is a novel approach for controlling who can initiate a declassification. Our contributions include a formal security condition and a sound approach to statically enforcing this condition. This article complements our earlier work on controlling where declassification can occur and what can be declassified.
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Lux, A., Mantel, H. (2009). Who Can Declassify?. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J., Martinelli, F. (eds) Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. FAST 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5491. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01465-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01465-9_3
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