Skip to main content

Parameterised Anonymity

  • Conference paper
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5491))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

We introduce the notion of parameterised anonymity, to formalize the anonymity property of protocols with an arbitrary number of participants. This definition is an extension of the well known CSP anonymity formalization of Schneider and Sidiropoulos [18]. Using recently developed invariant techniques for solving parameterised boolean equation systems, we then show that the Dining Cryptographers protocol guarantees parameterised anonymity with respect to outside observers. We also argue that although the question whether a protocol guarantees parameterised anonymity is in general undecidable, there are practical subclasses where anonymity can be decided for any group of processes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bhargava, M., Palamidessi, C.: Probabilistic anonymity. In: Abadi, M., de Alfaro, L. (eds.) CONCUR 2005. LNCS, vol. 3653, pp. 171–185. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Chaum, D.: The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and receiver untraceability. Journal of Cryptology 1, 65–75 (1988)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Chen, T., Ploeger, B., van de Pol, J., Willemse, T.A.C.: Equivalence checking for infinite systems using parameterized boolean equation systems. In: Caires, L., Vasconcelos, V.T. (eds.) CONCUR 2007. LNCS, vol. 4703, pp. 120–135. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Chothia, T., Orzan, S.M., Pang, J., Torabi Dashti, M.: A framework for automatically checking anonymity with μCRL. In: Montanari, U., Sannella, D., Bruni, R. (eds.) TGC 2006. LNCS, vol. 4661, pp. 301–318. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Comon, H., Shmatikov, V.: Is it possible to decide whether a cryptographic protocol is secure or not? J. Telecomm. and Inf. Tech. 4, 3–13 (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Groote, J.F., Mathijssen, A.H.J., Reniers, M.A., Usenko, Y.S., van Weerdenburg, M.J.: The formal specification language mCRL2. In: MMOSS, Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 06351 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Groote, J.F., Willemse, T.A.C.: Parameterised boolean equation systems. Theor. Comput. Sci. 343(3), 332–369 (2005)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Halpern, J.Y., O’Neill, K.R.: Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent systems. Journal of Computer Security, 483–514 (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Hughes, D., Shmatikov, V.: Information hiding, anonymity and privacy: A modular approach. Journal of Computer Security 12(1), 3–36 (2004)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Kremer, S., Ryan, M.D.: Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi-calculus. In: Sagiv, M. (ed.) ESOP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3444, pp. 186–200. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Küsters, R., Wilke, T.: Automata-based analysis of recursive cryptographic protocols. In: Diekert, V., Habib, M. (eds.) STACS 2004. LNCS, vol. 2996, pp. 382–393. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Kähler, D., Küsters, R., Wilke, T.: Deciding properties of contract-signing protocols. In: Diekert, V., Durand, B. (eds.) STACS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3404, pp. 158–169. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Lomuscio, A., Raimondi, F.: MCMAS: A model-checker for multi-agent systems. In: Hermanns, H., Palsberg, J. (eds.) TACAS 2006. LNCS, vol. 3920, pp. 450–454. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  14. Luttik, B.: On the expressiveness of choice quantification. Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 121(1), 39–87 (2003)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Mazaré, L.: Decidability of opacity with non-atomic keys. In: Proc. FAST 2004, pp. 71–84 (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Orzan, S.M., Willemse, T.A.C.: Invariants for parameterised boolean equation systems. In: van Breugel, F., Chechik, M. (eds.) CONCUR 2008. LNCS, vol. 5201, pp. 187–202. Springer, Heidelberg (to appear, 2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  17. Pfitzmann, A., Hansen, M.: Anonymity, unobservability, and pseudonymity: A proposal for terminology, draft v0.23 (August 2005)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Schneider, S., Sidiropoulos, A.: CSP and anonymity. In: Martella, G., Kurth, H., Montolivo, E., Bertino, E. (eds.) ESORICS 1996. LNCS, vol. 1146. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Shmatikov, V.: Probabilistic model checking of an anonymity system. Journal of Computer Security 12(3/4), 355–377 (2004)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Groote, J.F., Orzan, S. (2009). Parameterised Anonymity. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J., Martinelli, F. (eds) Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. FAST 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5491. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01465-9_12

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01465-9_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-01464-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-01465-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics