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Decay of Invincible Clusters of Cooperators in the Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

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Applications of Evolutionary Computing (EvoWorkshops 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5484))

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Abstract

Two types of invincible clusters of cooperators are defined in the one-dimensional evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game. These invincible clusters can either be peaceful or aggressive. The survival of these invincible clusters is discussed in the context of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with imitation and asynchronous updating procedure. The decay rates for these two types of clusters are analyzed numerically, for all enumeration of the configuration for small chain size. We find characteristic difference in the decay patterns of these two types of invincible clusters. The peaceful invincible clusters experience monotonic exponential decay, while the aggressive ones shows an interesting minimum in the density of cooperators before going through a slow exponential decay at long time. A heuristic argument for the existence of the minima is provided.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Physics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong, HKSAR, China

    Ching King Chan & Kwok Yip Szeto

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  1. Ching King Chan
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  2. Kwok Yip Szeto
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Animal Production Epidemiology and Ecology, University of Torino, Via Leonardo da Vinci 44, 10095, Grugliasco, Italy

    Mario Giacobini

  2. Quinn School of Business, Belfield, University College Dublin, Dublin 4, Ireland

    Anthony Brabazon

  3. Department of Computer Engineering, University of Parma, Viale Usberti 181/a, 43100, Parma, Italy

    Stefano Cagnoni

  4. Dalla Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence (IDSIA), Gallelria 2, 6928, Manno-Lugano, Switzerland

    Gianni A. Di Caro

  5. School of Engineering and Applied Science,Aston Triangle, Aston University, B4 7ET, Birmingham, UK

    Anikó Ekárt

  6. Complex Adaptive Systems Group, Instituto Tecnológico de Informática, Ciudad PolitŽcnica de la Innovacin, Edif. 8G Acceso B, 46022, Valencia, Spain

    Anna Isabel Esparcia-Alcázar

  7. Next Generation Itelligent Networks Research Center (nexGIN RC), National University of Computer and Emerging Sciences (NUCES), Islamabad, Pakistan

    Muddassar Farooq

  8. Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Helmut-Schmidt-University, Holstenhofweg 85, 22043, Hamburg, Germany

    Andreas Fink

  9. Department of Informatics Engineering, Polo II - Pinhal de Marrocos, University of Coimbra, 3030 - 290, Coimbra, Portugal

    Penousal Machado

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chan, C.K., Szeto, K.Y. (2009). Decay of Invincible Clusters of Cooperators in the Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In: Giacobini, M., et al. Applications of Evolutionary Computing. EvoWorkshops 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01129-0_28

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01129-0_28

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-01128-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-01129-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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