Abstract
WLAN is characterized by the high data rate and mobility. Among the current security technologies, the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) is applied into all Internet communications as a security solution. It is an extensible and complete network security program, which can protect the protocols operating in the upper layer. However, there are some problems to transfer IPSec into WLAN, especially for the key exchange protocols. This chapter first introduces the IKEv2 protocol, which is a popular IPSec key exchange protocol. Nevertheless, IKEv2 cannot be used in WLAN directly. Then a new WLAN key exchange protocol called WIKE, which is based on IKEv2, is proposed. The formal method of the provable secure key exchange protocol, Canetti-Krawczyk model, is analyzed. We also discuss the relationship between the security definitions of the CK model and the security properties of the key exchange protocol, and expand the CK model to make up the deficiency of the CK model that the forward secrecy is missed for an identity based system.
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© 2009 Higher Education Press, Beijing and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Ma, J., Wang, C., Ma, Z. (2009). Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol. In: Security Access in Wireless Local Area Networks. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00941-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00941-9_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-00940-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-00941-9