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Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference

CT-RSA 2009: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2009 pp 117–132Cite as

Adaptively Secure Two-Party Computation with Erasures

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5473))

Abstract

In the setting of multiparty computation a set of parties with private inputs wish to compute some joint function of their inputs, whilst preserving certain security properties (like privacy and correctness). An adaptively secure protocol is one in which the security properties are preserved even if an adversary can adaptively and dynamically corrupt parties during a computation. This provides a high level of security, that is arguably necessary in today’s world of active computer break-ins. Until now, the work on adaptively secure multiparty computation has focused almost exclusively on the setting of an honest majority, and very few works have considered the honest minority and two-party cases. In addition, significant computational and communication costs are incurred by most protocols that achieve adaptive security.

In this work, we consider the two-party setting and assume that honest parties may erase data. We show that in this model it is possible to securely compute any two-party functionality in the presence of adaptive semi-honest adversaries. Furthermore, our protocol remains secure under concurrent general composition (meaning that it remains secure irrespective of the other protocols running together with it). Our protocol is based on Yao’s garbled-circuit construction and, importantly, is as efficient as the analogous protocol for static corruptions. We argue that the model of adaptive corruptions with erasures has been unjustifiably neglected and that it deserves much more attention.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Aladdin Knowledge Systems and Bar-Ilan University, Israel

    Andrew Y. Lindell

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  1. Andrew Y. Lindell
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Theoretical Computer Science, TU Darmstadt, Hochschulstrasse 10, 64289, Darmstadt, Germany

    Marc Fischlin

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Lindell, A.Y. (2009). Adaptively Secure Two-Party Computation with Erasures. In: Fischlin, M. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2009. CT-RSA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5473. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00862-7_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00862-7_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-00861-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-00862-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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