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Local Sequentiality Does Not Help for Concurrent Composition

  • Andrew Y. Lindell
Conference paper
  • 831 Downloads
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5473)

Abstract

Broad impossibility results have been proven regarding the feasibility of obtaining protocols that remain secure under concurrent composition when there is no honest majority. These results hold both for the case of general composition (where a secure protocol is run many times concurrently with arbitrary other protocols) and self composition (where a single secure protocol is run many times concurrently). One approach for bypassing these impossibility results is to consider more limited settings of concurrency. In this paper, we investigate a restriction that we call local sequentiality. In this setting, every honest party in the multi-party network runs its protocol executions strictly sequentially (thus, sequentiality is preserved locally, but not globally). Since security is preserved under global sequential composition, one may conjecture that it also preserved under local sequentiality. However, we show that local sequentiality does not help. That is, any protocol that is secure under local sequentiality is also secure under concurrent self composition (when the scheduling is fixed). Thus, known impossibility results apply.

Keywords

Local Sequentiality Secure Protocol General Composition Impossibility Result Concurrent Execution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrew Y. Lindell
    • 1
  1. 1.Aladdin Knowledge Systems and Bar-Ilan UniversityIsrael

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