On the Security of a Certificate-Based Signature Scheme and Its Improvement with Pairings
In traditional public key signature, the public key of a signer is essentially a random string selected from a given set. It is infeasible to prove that a party is indeed the signer for a given signature. In general, the public key of a user needs a management authority to authenticate it. It results in that traditional public key cryptosystem (PKC) requires high maintenance cost for certificate management. Although, identity based cryptosystem (IBC) reduces the overhead of management, it suffers from the drawback of key escrow. Certificate-based cryptosystem combines the advantage of both PKC and IBC as it avoids the usage of certificates and does not suffer from key escrow. Recently, Liu et.al proposed an efficient Certificate-based signature and showed that the scheme was secure in the random oracles. Unfortunately, this paper shows that the scheme is insecure and discusses the flaws in their security proof. Then the corresponding attacks are given. To overcome the flaws, an improved scheme is proposed and the result shows that the scheme is provable secure against two game attacks of certificate-based signature in the random oracle model. The security is closely related to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
KeywordsSecurity analysis attack improved scheme the CDH problem certificate-based signature
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