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On the Correctness of an Approach against Side-Channel Attacks

  • Peng Wang
  • Dengguo Feng
  • Wenling Wu
  • Liting Zhang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5451)

Abstract

Side-channel attacks are a very powerful cryptanalytic technique. Li and Gu [ProvSec’07] proposed an approach against side-channel attacks, which states that a symmetric encryption scheme is IND-secure in side-channel model, if it is IND-secure in black-box model and there is no adversary who can recover the whole key of the scheme computationally in side-channel model, i.e. WKR-SCA ∧ IND → IND-SCA. Our researches show that it is not the case. We analyze notions of security against key recovery attacks and security against distinguishing attacks, and then construct a scheme which is WKR-SCA-secure and IND-secure, but not IND-SCA-secure in the same side-channel environment. Furthermore, even if the scheme is secure again partial key recovery attacks in side-channel model, this approach still does not hold true.

Keywords

Provable security Side-channel attack Symmetric encryption 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peng Wang
    • 1
  • Dengguo Feng
    • 2
  • Wenling Wu
    • 2
  • Liting Zhang
    • 2
  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Information SecurityGraduate University of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  2. 2.State Key Laboratory of Information SecurityInstitution of Software of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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