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A Framework for Authenticated Key Exchange in the Standard Model

  • Shuhua Wu
  • Yuefei Zhu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5451)

Abstract

We first introduce the new notion of the so-called target-independent smooth projective hashing (TISPHash) based on computationally-hiding commitments. Based on it and a class of pseudo-random functions (PRFs), we propose a framework for (PKI-based) authenticated key exchange protocols without random oracles and prove it to be secure in the (currently) strongest security definition, the extended Canetti-Krawczyk security definition. Our protocol is actually an abstraction of the efficient key exchange protocol of T. Okamoto. The abstracted protocol enjoys efficient instantiations from any secure encryption scheme that admits an efficient construction of TISPHash and allows a simple and intuitive understanding of its security. In some sense, our construction generalizes the design of T. Okamoto.

Keywords

authenticated key exchange Standard Model 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shuhua Wu
    • 1
  • Yuefei Zhu
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Networks EngineeringZhengzhou Information Science Technology InstituteZhengzhouChina

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