Abstract
Recently, argumentation-based negotiation has been proposed as an alternative to classical mechanism design. The main advantage of argumentation-based negotiation is that it allows agents to exchange complex justification positions rather than just simple proposals. Its proponents maintain that this property of argumentation protocols can lead to faster and beneficial agreements when used for complex multiagent negotiation. In this paper, we present an empirical comparison of argumentation-based negotiation to proposal-based negotiation in a strategic two-player scenario. We apply a game-theoretic solution as a benchmark, which requires full knowledge of the stage games. Our experiments show that in fact the argumentation-based approach outperforms the proposal-based approach with respect to the quality of the agreements found and the overall time to agreement.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds.): The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 2, pp. 460–482. Macmillan, London (1987)
Jennings, N.R., Parsons, S., Noriega, P., Sierra, C.: On argumentation-based negotiation. In: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems, Boston, USA (1998)
Kraus, S.: Automated negotiation and decision making in multiagent environments. In: Luck, M., Mařík, V., Štěpánková, O., Trappl, R. (eds.) ACAI 2001 and EASSS 2001. LNCS, vol. 2086, pp. 150–172. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Lomuscio, A., Wooldridge, M.J., Jennings, N.R.: A classification scheme for negotiation in electronic commerce. In: Sierra, C., Dignum, F.P.M. (eds.) AgentLink 2000. LNCS, vol. 1991, p. 19. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Maudet, N., Parsons, S., Rahwan, I.: Argumentation in multi-agent systems: Context and recent developments. In: Maudet, N., Parsons, S., Rahwan, I. (eds.) ArgMAS 2006. LNCS, vol. 4766, pp. 1–16. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Murray, C., Gordon, G.: Multi-robot negotiation: Approximating the set of subgame perfect equilibria in general sum stochastic games. In: Schölkopf, B., Platt, J., Hoffman, T. (eds.) Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, vol. 19. MIT Press, Cambridge (2007)
Nash, J.F.: The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18(2), 155–162 (1950)
Rahwan, I., Ramchurn, S., Jennings, N., McBurney, P., Parsons, S., Sonenberg, L.: Argumentation-based negotiation (2004)
Rahwan, I., Sonenberg, L., McBurney, P.: Bargaining and argument-based negotiation: Some preliminary comparisons. In: Proceedings of the AAMAS Workshop on Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems, New York (2004)
Russell, S.J., Norvig, P.: Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. Pearson Education, London (2003)
Sandholm, T.W.: Distributed rational decision making. In: Weiß, G. (ed.) Multiagent Systems: A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence, pp. 201–258. MIT Press, Cambridge (1999)
Wang, X., Sandholm, T.: Reinforcement learning to play an optimal nash equilibrium in team markov games. In: Becker, S.T.S., Obermayer, K. (eds.) Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, vol. 15, pp. 1571–1578. MIT Press, Cambridge (2003)
Weiß, G. (ed.): Multiagent Systems: A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence. MIT Press, Cambridge (1999)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Först, A., Rettinger, A., Nickles, M. (2009). Argumentation- vs. Proposal-Based Negotiation: An Empirical Case Study on the Basis of Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts. In: Rahwan, I., Moraitis, P. (eds) Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems. ArgMAS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5384. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00207-6_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-00207-6_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-00206-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-00207-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)