Abstract
This paper proposes a new kind of side-channel attack where the correlation between processed data and total capacitance seen looking into the power supply pin of a cryptographic device is exploited. The attack is introduced and advantages and drawbacks with respect to the well-known power analysis are discussed.
The attack implementation and experimental results attacking a static CMOS implementation of a 8051 microprocessor core are provided and a comparison between the proposed technique and power analysis is carried out. The obtained results are promising and future activities are planned to assess the performance of this new side-channel analysis when attacking secure implementations.
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Bucci, M., Luzzi, R., Scotti, G., Simonetti, A., Trifiletti, A. (2009). Differential Capacitance Analysis. In: Svensson, L., Monteiro, J. (eds) Integrated Circuit and System Design. Power and Timing Modeling, Optimization and Simulation. PATMOS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5349. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-95948-9_34
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-95948-9_34
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