Abstract
This paper offers a formalization of iterated belief revision for multiagent communication using the logic of communication graphs introduced in [15]. In this study we consider an agent (i.e., information source) capable of sending two types of message. In the first type, he tells that he knows a proposition, but in the second type, he tells that he believes a proposition. Consequently, iterated belief revision is brought about through a sequence of communication events (i.e., a history), and we propose a variation of the AGM rational postulates for history based belief revision. As we will show, a representation theorem is verified only for a class of restricted communication graphs. We consider this result to be a weak point in the application of the AGM postulates to multiagent communication, and propose a viable alternative.
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Suzuki, Y., Tojo, S., De Saeger, S. (2009). Iterated Belief Revision in the Face of Uncertain Communication. In: Baldoni, M., Son, T.C., van Riemsdijk, M.B., Winikoff, M. (eds) Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies VI. DALT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5397. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93920-7_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-93920-7_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-93919-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-93920-7
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