Skip to main content

Monetary Policy B

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Strategic Policy Interactions in a Monetary Union
  • 255 Accesses

The model of unemployment and inflation can be characterized by a system of two equations:

$${\rm u} = {\rm A} - \alpha {\rm M}$$
((1))
$${\rm \pi } = {\rm B} - \alpha \in {\rm M}$$
((2))

The targets of the European central bank are zero inflation and zero unemployment in Europe. The instrument of the European central bank is European money supply. There are two targets but only one instrument, so what is needed is a loss function. We assume that the European central bank has a quadratic loss function:

$${\rm L}_1 = {\rm \pi }^2 + {\rm u}^2 $$
((3))

L1 is the loss to the European central bank caused by inflation and unemployment. For ease of exposition we assume equal weights in the loss function. The specific target of the European central bank is to minimize the loss, given the inflation function and the unemployment function. Taking account of equations (1) and (2), the loss function of the European central bank can be written as follows:

$${\rm L}_1 = {\rm (B + \alpha \varepsilon M)}^2 + {\rm (A} - {\rm \alpha M)}^2$$
((4))

Then the first-order condition for a minimum loss is:

$${\rm M} = \frac{{{\rm A} - \in {\rm B}}}{{{\rm \alpha + \alpha } \in ^2 }}$$
((5))

Here M is the optimum level of European money supply. An increase in A requires an increase in European money supply. And an increase in B requires a cut in European money supply. From equations (1) and (5) follows the optimum rate of unemployment in Europe:

$${\rm u} = \frac{{ \in ^2 {\rm A} - \in {\rm B}}}{{{\rm 1 + } \in ^2 }}$$
((6))

And from equations (2) and (5) follows the optimum rate of inflation in Europe:

$${\rm \pi } = \frac{{ \in {\rm A} - {\rm B}}}{{{\rm 1 + } \in ^2 }}$$
((7))

The comparison of equations (6) and (7) gives:

$${\rm u = } \in {\rm \pi }$$
((8))

Unemployment in Europe is not zero, nor is inflation there.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Carlberg .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Carlberg, M. (2009). Monetary Policy B. In: Strategic Policy Interactions in a Monetary Union. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92751-8_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92751-8_3

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-92750-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-92751-8

  • eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics