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Efficient and Strongly Secure Password-Based Server Aided Key Exchange (Extended Abstract)

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Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2008 (INDOCRYPT 2008)

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Abstract

In ACNS’06, Cliff et al. proposed the password-based server aided key exchange (PSAKE) as one of password-based authenticated key exchanges in the three-party setting (3-party PAKE) in which two clients with different passwords exchange a session key by the help of their corresponding server. Though they also studied a strong security definition of 3-party PAKE, their security model is not strong enough because there are desirable security properties which cannot be captured. In this paper, we define a new formal security model of 3-party PAKE which is stronger than the previous model. Our model captures all known desirable security requirements of 3-party PAKE, like resistance to key-compromise impersonation, to leakage of ephemeral private keys of servers and to undetectable on-line dictionary attack. Also, we propose a new scheme as an improvement of PSAKE with the optimal number of rounds for a client, which is secure in the sense of our model.

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Yoneyama, K. (2008). Efficient and Strongly Secure Password-Based Server Aided Key Exchange (Extended Abstract) . In: Chowdhury, D.R., Rijmen, V., Das, A. (eds) Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2008. INDOCRYPT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5365. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89754-5_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-89754-5_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-89753-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-89754-5

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