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Our Brothers’ Keepers: Secure Routing with High Performance

  • Alex Brodsky
  • Scott Lindenberg
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5340)

Abstract

The Trinity [1] spam classification system is based on a distributed hash table that is implemented using a structured peer-to-peer overlay. Such an overlay must be capable of processing hundreds of messages per second, and must be able to route messages to their destination even in the presence of failures and malicious peers that misroute packets or inject fraudulent routing information into the system. Typically there is tension between the requirements to route messages securely and efficiently in the overlay.

We describe a secure and efficient routing extension that we developed within the I3 [2] implementation of the Chord [3] overlay. Secure routing is accomplished through several complementary approaches: First, peers in close proximity form overlapping groups that police themselves to identify and mitigate fraudulent routing information. Second, a form of random routing solves the problem of entire packet flows passing through a malicious peer. Third, a message authentication mechanism links each message to it sender, preventing spoofing. Fourth, each peer’s identifier links the peer to its network address, and at the same time uniformly distributes the peers in the key-space.

Lastly, we present our initial evaluation of the system, comprising a 255 peer overlay running on a local cluster. We describe our methodology and show that the overhead of our secure implementation is quite reasonable.

Keywords

Secure routing peer authentication distributed hash tables 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alex Brodsky
    • 1
  • Scott Lindenberg
    • 1
  1. 1.University of WinnipegWinnipegCanada

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