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A Logic for Reasoning about Rational Agents

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Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems (CLIMA 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 5056))

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Abstract

We have recently proposed an extension of alternating-time temporal logic for reasoning about behavior and abilities of agents under various rationality assumptions. The logic, called ATLP (“alternating-time temporal logic with plausibility”) used abstract, unstructured terms for addressing rationality assumptions. Here, we propose a more complex language of terms that allows to specify sets of rational strategy profiles in the object language, building upon existing work on logical characterizations of game-theoretic solution concepts. In particular, we recall how the notions of Nash equilibrium, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, and Pareto optimality can be characterized with logical formulae and we show how these can be used within ATLP for reasoning about what rational agents should achieve. We also prove complexity results for model checking of ATLP formulae.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Informatics, Clausthal University of Technology, Germany

    Wojciech Jamroga & Nils Bulling

Authors
  1. Wojciech Jamroga
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  2. Nils Bulling
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computing, Imperial College London, London, UK

    Fariba Sadri

  2. National Institute of Informatics, Sokendai, Japan

    Ken Satoh

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Jamroga, W., Bulling, N. (2008). A Logic for Reasoning about Rational Agents. In: Sadri, F., Satoh, K. (eds) Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems. CLIMA 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5056. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88833-8_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88833-8_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88832-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88833-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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