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Exploiting Hierarchical Goals in Bilateral Automated Negotiation: Empirical Study

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing ((LNBIP,volume 13))

Abstract

While argumentation-based negotiation has been accepted as a promising alternative to game-theoretic or heuristic based negotiation, no evidence has been provided to confirm this theoretical advantage. We propose a model of bilateral negotiation extending a simple monotonic concession protocol by allowing the agents to exchange information about their underlying interests and possible alternatives to achieve them during the negotiation. We present an empirical study that demonstrates (through simulation) the advantages of this interest-based negotiation approach over the more classic monotonic concession approach to negotiation.

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References

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Pasquier, P., Hollands, R., Dignum, F., Rahwan, I., Sonenberg, L. (2008). Exploiting Hierarchical Goals in Bilateral Automated Negotiation: Empirical Study. In: Collins, J., et al. Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis. AMEC TADA 2007 2007. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 13. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88713-3_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88713-3_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88712-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88713-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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