Abstract
Communication anonymity is becoming an increasingly important or even indispensable security requirement for critical information infrastructure protection and mission critical communications. Existing research in anonymous communications can largely be divided into two categories: mix-based systems and secure multiparty computation-based systems, originating from mixnet and DC-net respectively. However, all mix-based solutions require a trusted third party and cannot provide provable anonymity. While the secure multiparty computation-based approach suffers from transmission collusion problem that no practical solution exists to solve this problem. In this paper, we first propose a novel unconditionally secure source anonymous message (SAM) scheme that can be applied to any messages without relying on any trusted third parties. While ensuring message sender anonymity, the proposal scheme can also provide message content authenticity. We also propose a novel communication protocol that can hide both the senders and the recipients from each other and the network addresses of their end-to-end source and destination. The proposed protocols can be applied to both overlay networks as well as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). It can also be used for critical infrastructure protection and secure file sharing. The security analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol is secure against various attacks. Our analysis also shows it is efficient and practical.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24, 84–88 (1981)
Chaum, D.: The dinning cryptographer problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability. Journal of Cryptology 1(1), 65–75 (1988)
Goel, S., Robson, M., Polte, M., Sirer, E.G.: Herbivore: A Scalable and Efficient Protocol for Anonymous Communication. Tech. Rep. 2003-1890, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY (February 2003)
Pointcheval, D., Stern, J.: Security arguments for digital signatures and blind signatures. Journal of Cryptology 13(3), 361–396 (2000)
Harn, L., Xu, Y.: Design of generalized ElGamal type digital signature schemes based on discret logarithm. Electronics Letters 30(24), 2025–2026 (1994)
Nyberg, K., Rueppel, R.A.: Message recovery for signature schemes based on the discrete logarithm problem. In: Santis, A.D. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1994. LNCS, vol. 950, pp. 182–193. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)
Reiter, M.K., Rubin, A.D.: Crowds: anonymity for web transaction. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 1(1), 66–92 (1998)
F. P. 180-1, Secure hash standard (April 1995), http://itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fips180-1.htm
Balfanz, D., Durfee, G., Shankar, N., Smetters, D., Staddon, J., Wong, H.C.: Secure handshakes from pairing-based key agreements. In: IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, Oakland, CA (May 2003)
Zhang, Y., Liu, W., Lou, W., Fang, Y.: MASK: Anonymous on-demand routing in mobile ad hoc networks. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications 5(9), 2376–2385 (2006)
Beimel, A., Dolev, S.: Buses for anonymous message delivery. J. Cryptology 16, 25–39 (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Ren, J. (2008). Privacy-Preserving Communication Algorithms and Network Protocols. In: Li, Y., Huynh, D.T., Das, S.K., Du, DZ. (eds) Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications. WASA 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5258. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88582-5_48
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88582-5_48
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88581-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88582-5
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)