Turkey and European Security

Turkish membership in the European Union has been and, it is safe to assume, will continue to be an issue hotly debated by experts, policymakers and public opinion alike. As argued by EU Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Frits Bolkenstein , in a view shared by many European officials and a majority of European public opinion, because of Turkey's size, political, economic and social problems and other specificities, Europe would implode should Turkey become a full member. Opponents also argue that expanding the Union's borders to such neighbours as Iran , Iraq and Syria will drag the EU into areas and disputes it could otherwise more easily stay out of (Hughes, 2006). A significant number of European officials and EU member states have a different, perhaps more strategic perspective. They believe that Turkish accession would promote greater stability in its ‘near-abroad’, ultimately benefiting the EU, and finally dispel Huntington 's notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ along the cultural fault-lines of Christianity and Islam (Desai, 2005, p. 367).1

Indeed, one of the most frequently discussed questions is whether Turkey's EU membership would be an asset for the EU in terms of foreign and security policy. As rightly argued by a Turkish analyst, Turkey is being recognized by the EU as an important [pivotal even, by Paul Kennedy's definition (Chase, Hill, & Kennedy, 1996, pp. 33–51)] country, especially from a geographical and geostrategic point of view and this will be Turkey's strongest card in its effort to join the Union or, should negotiations fail, to develop a privileged relationship with the EU (Oguzlu, 2003, p. 288).