Abstract
Auctions are a good tool for dealing with resource allocation in multi-agent environments. When the resources are either renewable or perishable, a repeated auction mechanism is needed, in what is known as recurrent auctions. However, several problems arise with this kind of auction, namely, the resource waste problem, the bidder drop problem, and the asymmetric balance of negotiation power. In this paper we present different mechanisms to deal with these issues. We have evaluated the mechanisms in a network bandwidth allocation scenario, and the results show that the proposed mechanisms achieve higher benefits for the auctioneer, while also providing a fairer behavior.
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Murillo, J., Muñoz, V., López, B., Busquets, D. (2008). A Fair Mechanism for Recurrent Multi-unit Auctions. In: Bergmann, R., Lindemann, G., Kirn, S., Pěchouček, M. (eds) Multiagent System Technologies. MATES 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5244. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87805-6_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87805-6_14
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