Cooperation in Co-evolving Networks: The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag-Hunt Games

  • Enea Pestelacci
  • Marco Tomassini
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 5199)


Interactions giving rise to dilemmas are widespread in society. Starting from the observation that individuals interact through networks of acquaintances, we study the co-evolution of the agents’ strategies and of the social network itself using two prototypical games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt. We find that cooperation and coordination can be achieved through the self-organization of the social network into strong and stable clusters of identical strategies.


Nash Equilibrium Random Graph Replicator Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory Full Cooperation 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Enea Pestelacci
    • 1
  • Marco Tomassini
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Systems Department, HECUniversity of LausanneSwitzerland

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