Abstract
This paper presents and evaluates an improved anonymity revocation protocol. This protocol can be used to strengthen anonymity revocation capability in a privacy-enhancing identity management system. This protocol is user-centric, abuse-resistant, and it provides enforceable conditions fulfillment. We assume the existence of 1 honest referee out of t designated referees (t > 1) chosen by users, and no collusion between users and referees. The security and performance of this protocol are evaluated.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bangerter, E., Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A.: A cryptographic framework for the controlled release of certified data. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds.) Security Protocols 2004. LNCS, vol. 3957, pp. 20–42. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Camenisch, J., Sommer, D., Zimmermann, R.: A general certification framework with applications to privacy-enhancing certificate infrastructures. In: Fischer-Hübner, S., Rannenberg, K., Yngström, L., Lindskog, S. (eds.) SEC. IFIP, vol. 201, pp. 25–37. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Brands, S.: Identity: Setting the larger context, achieving the right outcomes. In: 7th Annual Privacy and Security Workshop & 15th CACR Information Security Workshop (November 2006)
Liu, J.K., Tsang, P.P., Wong, D.S., Zhu, R.W.: Universal custodian-hiding verifiable encryption for discrete logarithms. In: Won, D.H., Kim, S. (eds.) ICISC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3935, pp. 389–409. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Bellare, M., Goldwasser, S.: Verifiable partial key escrow. In: 4th ACM CCS, pp. 78–91. ACM, New York (1997)
Bhargav-Spantzel, A., Camenisch, J., Gross, T., Sommer, D.: User centricity: a taxonomy and open issues. In: Juels, A., Winslett, M., Goto, A. (eds.) DIM, pp. 1–10. ACM, New York (2006)
Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A.: A signature scheme with efficient protocols. In: Cimato, S., Galdi, C., Persiano, G. (eds.) SCN 2002. LNCS, vol. 2576, pp. 268–289. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Camenisch, J., Shoup, V.: Practical verifiable encryption and decryption of discrete logarithms. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 126–144. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A.: Signature schemes and anonymous credentials from bilinear maps. In: Franklin, M.K. (ed.) CRYPTO 2004. LNCS, vol. 3152, pp. 56–72. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Suriadi, S., Foo, E., Smith, J.: A user-centric protocol for conditional anonymity revocation. Technical Report 13123, Queensland University of Technology (March 2008), http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/00013123/
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Suriadi, S., Foo, E., Smith, J. (2008). A User-Centric Protocol for Conditional Anonymity Revocation. In: Furnell, S., Katsikas, S.K., Lioy, A. (eds) Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business. TrustBus 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5185. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85735-8_18
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85735-8_18
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85734-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85735-8
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)