Abstract
In this paper we consider a multiobjective cooperative game with restrictions on coalitions. We define the restricted game of the original multiobjective cooperative game and discuss its properties, namely inheritance of superadditivity and convexity under appropriate combinatorial structures on the feasible coalition system. We also study the core of the restricted game.
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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Tanino, T. (2009). Multiobjective Cooperative Games with Restrictions on Coalitions. In: Barichard, V., Ehrgott, M., Gandibleux, X., T'Kindt, V. (eds) Multiobjective Programming and Goal Programming. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 618. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85646-7_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85646-7_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85645-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85646-7
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