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Distributed Norm Enforcement: Ostracism in Open Multi-Agent Systems

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Computable Models of the Law

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4884))

Abstract

Enforcement in normative agent societies is a complex issue, which becomes more problematic as these societies become more decentralized and open. A new distributed mechanism is presented to enforce norms by ostracizing agents that do not abide by them in their interactions with other agents in the society. Simulations are run to check the mechanism’s impact in different types of societies. The simulations have shown that complete ostracism is not always possible, but the mechanism substantially reduces the number of norm violations.

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Perreau de Pinninck, A., Sierra, C., Schorlemmer, M. (2008). Distributed Norm Enforcement: Ostracism in Open Multi-Agent Systems. In: Casanovas, P., Sartor, G., Casellas, N., Rubino, R. (eds) Computable Models of the Law. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4884. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85569-9_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85569-9_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85568-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85569-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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