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Notes
- 1.
The seminal work in this school of thought is Waltz 1979.
- 2.
Gourevitch 1978.
- 3.
Regarding countries' “individual situations” and the “triple shocks,” see the introduction to this volume.
- 4.
Political governance is defined here as a complex of rules that regulate the vertical and horizontal relationships between political authorities and civil society, as well as the relationship between different elements of state hierarchies. Although this definition is quite close to the more widely used concept of “political regime,” the notion of political governance is more attuned to informal ruling coalition than to the formal rules and procedures of a political regime.
- 5.
“Ruling coalition” often refers to the association of multiple political parties to form a cabinet/government in the parliamentary system when one party cannot win the electoral majority to form a cabinet on its own. Ruling coalition is defined here, however, as an informal political alliance between the incumbent government (or parts of the government such as the top political leadership) on one hand, and a group or groups of societal forces (powerful political constituents) on the other. The two parties forge a political alliance based upon coincidence of interests, under which the government provides favors and benefits for the coalition partner group in return for the latter's support. Examples are Olson's “distributional coalition” and the “triple alliance” or “trio” formed by the incumbent military government, domestic bourgeoisie and foreign capital in some Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s. See Olson 1982; and Evans 1979.
- 6.
Tangible or intangible resources controlled by the state and its coalition partner constitute the bargaining power of each party. On the part of the state, they could be various formal and informal benefits, favors and privileges granted to the coalition partner, while bargaining power of the latter may include political support and loyalty, voting power, financial resources, and media control. Powerful constituents with high bargaining power could simultaneously constitute a crucial political support base and a critical political constraint. See North 1981.
- 7.
Horelick 1974.
- 8.
The term “oligarchs” refers to those who control a great portion of the Russian economy and wield enormous political and economic influence in Russian society. They garnered enormous wealth in the chaotic early reform years, particularly via noneconomic methods in the nontransparent privatization process. For an excellent account of oligarchs, see Hoffman 2002.
- 9.
Hellman 1998.
- 10.
Immediately after the Soviet collapse, the Russian Federation consisted of eighty-nine federal subjects, in which over 160 ethnic groups and indigenous peoples resided. Some federal subjects have since merged, and as of the end of 2007 there were eighty-five federal subjects altogether in the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, as the successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia lost almost half of the entire Soviet population and over twenty percent of its territory.
- 11.
Although Russia's sub-federal political units are generally called ‘regions,’ this chapter refers to them as ‘provinces’ to avoid confusion with external regions (i.e., Northeast Asia).
- 12.
Anderson 1974.
- 13.
Filippov and Shvetsova 1999.
- 14.
- 15.
Kim 2005, 361–65.
- 16.
In Moscow—Beijing summits during the 1990s, leaders of both sides made their opposition to US “hegemonism” very explicit.
- 17.
A red-brown coalition formed in the Duma among conservative communists and nationalists, and won impressive victories in consecutive elections in 1993 and 1995. The Communist Party, Liberal Democratic Party, and Agrarian Party combined to win over 32% and 50% of total Duma seats in 1993 and 1995 respectively.
- 18.
While the population of the Russian Far East is only 8 million and falling, the three neighboring provinces of China—Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning—boast a population of almost 100 million. During 1992–1996, the population of Russia's Far East decreased by 7%. Vitkovskaia et al. 2000.
- 19.
Wishnick 2002.
- 20.
Blank 1997.
- 21.
Vitkovskaia et al. 2000, 84.
- 22.
Brown 1992.
- 23.
Russia was able to obtain $3 billion in commercial loans from South Korea on very favorable terms. In the 1990s, some Korean companies made inroads into Russia, but most of them, faced with unfavorable legal and infrastructural problems, decided to retreat shortly thereafter.
- 24.
Primakov was appointed as Foreign Minister in 1996 and promoted to Prime Minister in 1998.
- 25.
- 26.
Moscow Times 6 June 2001.
- 27.
During 1995–1997, domestic financial sources, mostly revenues from shortterm government bonds, accounted for 38 to 55% of budget deficit financing while the rest came from foreign sources. Goskomstat 1998.
- 28.
The most powerful oligarchs were hit hardest. For example, Mikhail Khodorkovskii's Bank Menatep and Vladimir Potanin's Oneksimbank went bankrupt, while Vladimir Vinogradov's Inkombank totally disappeared. Smolenskii (SBS-Agro bank) was no longer retained in Russia's oligarch list. Boris Berezovskii (MFK financial company) and Vladimir Gusinskii (Most-Group) survived only to be purged by Putin a couple of years later.
- 29.
Prices of crude oil hit bottom in 1998 (below $15 per barrel), contributing in part to the 1998 financial meltdown, but began to recover after 1999 and almost doubled by 2000 ($30 per barrel).
- 30.
By 2000, the federal budget surplus reached 2.5% of GDP. Moscow Times, 21 October 2002.
- 31.
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20 March 2000; and Whitmore 2005.
- 32.
Zudin 2001.
- 33.
C. Fred Bergsten, “Toward a Tripartite World.” Economist, 13 July 2000.
- 34.
- 35.
Lo 2003, 3.
- 36.
Russia now ranks the third in terms of the size of its foreign currency reserve, which amounted to $225 billion by mid-2006 (Moscow Times 5 May 2006). The Stabilization Fund, made up of a portion of oil revenues, had contributed another $5.9 billion by mid-2003. Moscow News, May 2004 Available from <http://www.mosnews.com/money/2004/05?07/stabilizationfund.shtml >.
- 37.
- 38.
In 1990–2000, foreign direct investment in Russia averaged $2.3 billion a year. This compares to $30 billion in China, $3.7 billion in Poland, and $3.2 billion in Hungary. See UNCTAD 2006.
- 39.
In the 1999 national elections, Russia's representative liberal parties, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, won 5.93% and 8.52% of Duma seats respectively. In the 2003 elections, both failed to reach the threshold of 5% of votes, thereby completely losing their party-list proportional seats.
- 40.
The new treaty stipulates five important areas of cooperation: joint actions to offset a perceived US “hegemonism”; demarcation of the two countries' longdisputed 4,300 kilometer border; arms sales and technology transfers; energy and raw materials supply; and the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia.
- 41.
Russia gained full membership in APEC in November 1998.
- 42.
Together with the Comprehensive Program of Action to Promote Cooperation between the Russian Federation and ASEAN 2005–2015, this agreement on economic development cooperation laid a solid legal foundation for collaboration between Russia and ASEAN.
- 43.
Shkuropat 2002.
- 44.
China surpassed the United States and Japan as South Korea's largest trade partner, in 2003 with their total trade volume amounting to over $100 billion. China is also Korea's largest foreign investment destination, accounting for almost 40% of its total foreign investment.
- 45.
The United Russia party won 222 of 450 seats. However, this formal figure actually underestimates Putin's power, since most of the minority party and “independent” members were in fact his Putin's clients or supporters.
- 46.
Previously, half of the seats were filled by a party-list system of proportional representation and the other half with individual representatives from single-member districts.
- 47.
Putin's federal reform measures included: the introduction of the seven Federal Districts, under the jurisdiction of each of which fell at least twelve or more existing federal subjects; the introduction of a new electoral system for the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament; the creation of the State Council presided over by the president and composed of heads of the seven Federal Districts and heads of regional governments; and the introduction of a new residential power to dismiss regional chiefs and dissolve regional parliaments.
- 48.
- 49.
For details on the Yukos affair, visit the Carnegie Moscow Center's special section on the topic at <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/topic/66791.htm >.
- 50.
Kommersant, 27 June 2005.
- 51.
Some of the main features of the early modern European mercantilism included: (a) state intervention in the national economy and foreign trade; (b) protection of domestic industries against foreign competition; (c) overseas expansion in the form of colonialism; (d) emphasis on exports over imports based on the zero-sum model of world trade; and (e) bellicosity emphasizing the necessity and profitability of warfare.
- 52.
Putin, for example, made special reference in his 26 August 2004 Address to the Federal Assembly to energy projects and transport infrastructure in Eastern Russia, including oil and gas pipeline projects. Available from <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/05/26/1309_type700129_71650.shtml >.
- 53.
See Energy Strategy 2020, Russia's long-term national energy strategy document approved in August 2003. Pravitel'stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2003.
- 54.
Synovitz 2005.
- 55.
Simonia 2006, 27–28.
- 56.
Only four Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) joined this treaty.
- 57.
While Uzbekistan left, Belarus and Armenia newly joined the bloc.
- 58.
Asia Times, 31 May 2006.
- 59.
The Shanghai Five was organized in 1997 as a joint Russian—Chinese initiative to address regional security issues among five neighbors: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
- 60.
At this point, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Five to create the SCO.
- 61.
SCO 2001.
- 62.
Putin 2006.
- 63.
Lavrov 2006.
- 64.
On this view, see Shevtsova 2006.
- 65.
Putin's pragmatists include those younger economists and executive managers from St. Petersburg who had proven their market value, such as Gazprom Chief Aleksei Miller, First Vice Premier Dmitrii Medvedev, former First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Dmitrii Kozak, Head of the Russian Federal Agency for Federal Property Management Valerii Nazarov, and Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref.
- 66.
Orttung 2004.
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Kim, T. (2009). Impassive to Imperial? Russia in Northeast Asia from Yeltsin to Putin. In: Aggarwal, V.K., Koo, M.G., Lee, S., Moon, Ci. (eds) Northeast Asia. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79594-0_6
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