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On the Social Cost of Distributed Selfish Content Replication

  • Gerasimos G. Pollatos
  • Orestis A. Telelis
  • Vassilis Zissimopoulos
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4982)

Abstract

We study distributed content replication networks formed voluntarily by selfish autonomous users, seeking access to information objects that originate from distant servers. Each user caters to minimization of its individual access cost by replicating locally (up to constrained storage capacity) a subset of objects, and accessing the rest from the nearest possible location. We show existence of stable networks by proving existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for a game-theoretic formulation of this situation. Social (overall) cost of stable networks is measured by the average or by the maximum access cost experienced by any user. We study socially most and least expensive stable networks by means of tight bounds on the ratios of the Price of Anarchy and Stability respectively. Although in the worst case the ratios may coincide, we identify cases where they differ significantly. We comment on simulations exhibiting occurence of cost-efficient stable networks on average.

Keywords

Social Cost Access Cost Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium General Network Model Pure Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerasimos G. Pollatos
    • 1
  • Orestis A. Telelis
    • 2
  • Vassilis Zissimopoulos
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Informatics and TelecommunicationsUniversity of AthensGreece
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of AarhusDenmark

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