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A Performance Analysis of Authentication Using Covert Timing Channels

  • Reed Newman
  • Raheem Beyah
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4982)

Abstract

Authentication over a network is an important and difficult problem. Accurately determining the authenticity of a node or user is critical in maintaining the security of a network. Our proposed technique covertly embeds a watermark, or identifying tag, within a data stream. By implementing this model on a LAN and WLAN we show that this method is easily adaptable to a variety of networking technologies, and easily scalable. While our technique increases the time required for data to be transferred, we show that the throughput of the link during the brief authentication window is decreased by no more than 8% in a switched LAN and 11% in a WLAN. During our empirical analysis we were able to detect the watermark with 100% accuracy in both a LAN and WLAN environment.

Keywords

Step Stone Network Throughput Covert Channel Timing Perturbation Node Authentication 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Reed Newman
    • 1
  • Raheem Beyah
    • 1
  1. 1.Communications Assurance and Performance Group, Computer Science DepartmentGeorgia State UniversityAtlantaUSA

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