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1-out-of-n Oblivious Signatures

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Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2008)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4991))

Abstract

An oblivious signature with n keys (or messages) is a signature that the recipient can choose one of n keys (or messages) to get signed while the signer cannot find out on which key (or message) the recipient has got the signature. This kind of signature is firstly introduced by L. Chen in 1994. However, the previous reference does not crisply formalize the notion. Furthermore, the proposed constructions are less efficient in both communication and computation. In this paper, we first give formal definitions on the model of oblivious signatures. Then, based on the Schnorr signature, we propose our efficient oblivious signature scheme. A comparison result is also provided in this paper which shows that our scheme is more efficient than Chen’s schemes and those using a combination of a signature scheme and an oblivious transfer protocol.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, National Chengchi University, No.64, Sec.2, ZhiNan Rd., Taipei City, 11605, Taiwan

    Raylin Tso

  2. Department of Risk Engineering Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8573, Japan

    Takeshi Okamoto & Eiji Okamoto

Authors
  1. Raylin Tso
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  2. Takeshi Okamoto
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  3. Eiji Okamoto
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Editor information

Liqun Chen Yi Mu Willy Susilo

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Tso, R., Okamoto, T., Okamoto, E. (2008). 1-out-of-n Oblivious Signatures. In: Chen, L., Mu, Y., Susilo, W. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4991. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79104-1_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79104-1_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-79103-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-79104-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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