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Formal Pervasive Verification of a Paging Mechanism

  • Eyad Alkassar
  • Norbert Schirmer
  • Artem Starostin
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4963)

Abstract

Memory virtualization by means of demand paging is a crucial component of every modern operating system. The formal verification is challenging since reasoning about the page fault handler has to cover two concurrent computational sources: the processor and the hard disk. We accurately model the interleaved executions of devices and the page fault handler, which is written in a high-level programming language with inline assembler portions. We describe how to combine results from sequential Hoare logic style reasoning about the page fault handler on the low-level concurrent machine model. To the best of our knowledge this is the first example of pervasive formal verification of software communicating with devices.

Keywords

Virtual Machine Hard Disk Physical Machine Physical Memory Page Fault 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eyad Alkassar
    • 1
  • Norbert Schirmer
    • 1
  • Artem Starostin
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentSaarland University 

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