Skip to main content

When entry of the relatively inefficient firms is deterred due to fixed costs, leading to a monopoly of the relatively efficient firm, guaranteed production quota for the less efficient ones can increase consumers' surplus. In other words, restricting the output of more efficient firm helps to reduce the price compared to the monopoly level. If the emergence of monopoly is independent of the level of fixed costs of the inefficient competitors, monopoly is the more efficient outcome. This has relevance for the recent entry of China in WTO and the abolition of export quotas in textiles. This also qualifies the conventional wisdom in the trade policy literature that quantitative restrictions are necessarily anticompetitive. The optimal policy can be to keep in place a quota but allow it to be licensed to the more efficient exporter.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Brander JA, Spencer BJ (1985) Export subsidies and international market share rivalry. J Int Econ 18:83–100

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brander JA, Spencer BJ (1983) International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy. Rev Econ Stud 50:707–722

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Choi EK, Marjit S (2005) On the non-equivalence of tariff and quota in a competitive general equilibrium framework. Mimeo, City University of Hong Kong

    Google Scholar 

  • Helpman E, Krugman P (1989) Trade policy and market structure. MIT Press, Massachusetts

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones R, Takemori S (1989) Foreign monopoly and optimal tariffs for the small open economy. Eur Econ Rev 33:1691–1707

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kabiraj T, Marjit S (2003) Protecting consumers through protection: the role of tariff induced technology transfer. Eur Econ Rev 47:113–124

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krishna K (1987) Tariffs versus quotas with endogenous quality. J Int Econ 23:97–112

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krishna K (1989) Trade restrictions as facilitating practices. J Int Econ 26:251–270

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krugman P (1994) Rethinking international trade. MIT Press, Massachusetts

    Google Scholar 

  • Mukherjee A, Pennings E (2006) Tariffs, licensing and market structure. Eur Econ Rev 50:1699–1707

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saggi K (2002) Trade, foreign direct Investment, and international technology transfer: a survey. World Bank Res Observ 17:191–235

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Sugata Marjit , Tarun Kabiraj or Arijit Mukherjee .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Marjit, S., Kabiraj, T., Mukherjee, A. (2009). Quota as a Competitive Device. In: Kamihigashi, T., Zhao, L. (eds) International Trade and Economic Dynamics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78676-4_14

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics