Abstract
We introduce and formalise security properties in our model. In particular, we introduce secrecy and several forms of authentication. Using these security properties, we revisit the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
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References
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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Cremers, C., Mauw, S. (2012). Security Properties. In: Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78636-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78636-8_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-78635-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-78636-8
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