Abstract
In multi-issue negotiation, an opponent’s preference is rarely open. Under this environment, it is difficult to acquire a negotiation result that realizes win-win negotiation. In this paper, we present a novel method for realizing win-win negotiation although an opponent’s preference is not open. In this method, an agent learns how to make a concession to an opponent. To learn the concession strategy, we adopt reinforcement learning. In reinforcement learning, the agent recognizes a negotiation state to each issue in negotiation. According to the state, the agent makes a proposal to increase own profit. A reward of the learning is a profit of an agreement and punishment of negotiation breakdown. Experimental results showed that agents could acquire a negotiation strategy that avoids negotiation breakdown and increases profits of both sides. Finally, the agents can acquire the action policy that strikes a balance between cooperation and competition.
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Yoshikawa, S., Yasumura, Y., Uehara, K. (2008). Strategy Acquisition on Multi-issue Negotiation without Estimating Opponent’s Preference. In: Nguyen, N.T., Jo, G.S., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications. KES-AMSTA 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4953. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78582-8_38
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78582-8_38
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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