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The Legitimacy of United Nations Security Council Decisions in the Fight against Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some Critical Remarks

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Legitimacy in International Law

Part of the book series: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht ((BEITRÄGE,volume 194))

Abstract

In November 2003, during the conference on Development of International Law in Treaty Making, the current author concluded that Security Council practice in the post Cold War era has swayed between complete inaction and overreaction.1 This extreme situation is a reflection of the reality that decision-making within the Security Council in the post Cold War era is driven by the (short term) political interests of the only remaining super-power and its closest allies — interests which are frequently being pursued at the expense of the international community as a whole and at the expense of international law.2 Moreover, it is unrealistic to believe that this situation will change in the near future.

B. Iur.; LL.B.; LL.D. (University of the Free State, South Africa); LL.M. (Harvard); Habil. (Zurich); Professor of International Constitutional Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Extraordinary Professor, North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa. The contribution also forms part of a so-called VICI project of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), titled The emerging international constitutional order: the implications of hierarchy in international law for the coherence and legitimacy of international decision-making.

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References

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  1. Department of International Law, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Erika de Wet

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Rüdiger Wolfrum Volker Röben

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de Wet, E. (2008). The Legitimacy of United Nations Security Council Decisions in the Fight against Terrorism and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some Critical Remarks. In: Wolfrum, R., Röben, V. (eds) Legitimacy in International Law. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 194. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77764-9_7

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