Abstract
Fully agreeing with Helen Keller’s paper1 on codes of conduct this comment will develop a further argument in support of its conclusions. It will show that the legitimacy of such codes affects the legitimacy of international law. For that purpose it will address the legitimacy of international law in the light of its lacunae. At issue is whether a legitimate code of conduct can justify a gap in international law and the relevant omission by the international community. A gap in the broad meaning of this contribution exists either because the relevant international law does not apply, or because existing international law is not respected, or because there is no adequate regulation in international law.2
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References
H. Keller, “Codes of Conduct and their Implementation: the Question of Legitimacy”, in this volume, 219 et seq.
On the issue of gaps in detail U. Fastenrath, Lücken im Völkerrecht, 1991, 15 et seq.
See in detail on this issue the contributions by Rüdiger Wolfrum, p. 1 et seq., Robert Keohane, p. 25 et seq.
I. Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, 1870, ed by J. H. von Kirchmann, § 46, 152.
The third world approach to international law has always questioned this understanding, B. S. Chimni, “An outline of a Marxist course on public international law”, Leiden Journal of International Law 17 (2004), 1.
In that respect one can even doubt that codes are to be considered soft law. One should reserve that category for measures enacted by public institutions after a legally defined procedure; for a fitting concept of law see F. von Alemann, “Die Notwendigkeit eines formalen Rechtsbegriffes der Unionsrechtsordnung”, Der Staat 3 (2006), 35.
R. Wolfrum/ V. Röben (eds), Developments of international law in treaty making, 2005.
8 That corporate activity can severely affect such rights is shown by the cases brought under the US-American Alien Tort Statute which provides for federal jurisdiction over violations of international law. Examples of cases with corporate defendants are: Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2nd Cir. 2000) (allegations of human rights violations); Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 1250 (D.C.N.D. Alabama 2003) (allegations of labor rights violations); and Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Co., 343 F.3d 140 (2nd. Cir. 2003) (allegations of environmental destruction).
This derived legitimacy of private law and contracts is contested; some construe freedom of contract as a fundamental right no public power can interfere with. Be that as it may, very few constitutions protect international economic activity, and those who do give public authorities much more leeway to curtail it than with respect to purely domestic activity; see in detail on the constitutional protection of transnational economic activity H. Hohmann, Angemessene Auβenhandelsfreiheit im Vergleich. Die Rechtspraxis der USA, Deutschlands (inklusive der EG) und Japans zum Auβenhandel und ihre Konstitutionalisierung, 2002; V. Epping, Die Auβenwirtschaftsfreiheit, 1989.
This dimension is well developed in many constitutional orders, but not in the US. For a reconstruction in the German tradition see T. Giegerich, Privatwirkung der Grundrechte in den USA. Die State Action Doctrine des US Supreme Court und die Bürgerrechtsgesetzgebung des Bundes, 1992.
In the German legal order there are important examples of private schemes (though not strictly Codes of Conduct) by which public regulation is avoided, see M. Burgi, Funktionale Privatisierung und Verwaltungshilfe, 1999.
I. Winkelmann, “Responsibility to protect”, in: R. Wolfrum et al. (eds), MaxPlanck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (forthcoming); CESCR General comment 3, The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.l), 1990.
The question whether this is the most appropriate reconstruction of international law will not be deepened at this point. In my understanding some coherence is an indispensable requirement of justice. On coherence see V. Bruns, “Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1 (1929), 1.
See the contributions of W. E. Holder, G. Hafner and K. Wellens on the topic “Can International Organizations be Controlled? Accountability and Responsibility”, in: American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 97th annual meeting 97 (2003), 231.
H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 1934, 115 et seq., 328; G. Scelle, Le Pacte des Nations et sa liaison avec Le Traité de Paix, 1919, 101 et seq., 105 et seq.; id., 1 Précis de droit des gens, 1932, 188 et seq.; W. Schücking, “Die Organisation der Welt”, in: W. van Calker (ed.), Festschrift für Paul Laband, 1908, 533; A. Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, 1926; C. W. Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind, 1958; C. Tomuschat, “International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century, General Course on Public International Law”, Recueil des cours 281 (1999), 2001, 95, 161 et seq.
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von Bogdandy, A. (2008). Codes of Conduct and the Legitimacy of International Law. In: Wolfrum, R., Röben, V. (eds) Legitimacy in International Law. Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, vol 194. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77764-9_13
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