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Nonadaptive Selfish Routing with Online Demands

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Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking (CAAN 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCCN,volume 4852))

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Abstract

We study the efficiency of selfish routing problems in which traffic demands are revealed online. We go beyond the common Nash equilibrium concept in which possibly all players reroute their flow and form a new equilibrium upon arrival of a new demand.

In our model, demands arrive in n sequential games. In each game, the new demands form a Nash equilibrium and their routings remain unchanged afterwards. We study the problem both with nonatomic and atomic player types and with continuous and nondecreasing latency functions on the edges. For polynomial latency functions, we give constant upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio of the resulting online routing in terms of the maximum degree, the number of games and in the atomic setting the number of players. In particular, for nonatomic players and affine latency functions we show that the competitive ratio is at most \(4n\over n+2\). Finally, we present improved upper bounds for the special case of two nodes connected by parallel arcs.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Mathematics, Technical University Berlin, 10623, Berlin, Germany

    Tobias Harks

  2. Department of Operations Research, Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary, H-1117

    László A. Végh

Authors
  1. Tobias Harks
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  2. László A. Végh
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Jeannette Janssen Paweł Prałat

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Harks, T., Végh, L.A. (2007). Nonadaptive Selfish Routing with Online Demands. In: Janssen, J., Prałat, P. (eds) Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking. CAAN 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4852. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77294-1_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77294-1_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77293-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77294-1

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