Abstract
Without doubt, taxation is one of the most powerful motivational forces in corporate life. Tax consequences are important determinants of capital structure, dividend payments and the arrangement of groups of companies, amongst many other things. In view of this, it seems quite surprising that codes of “good” corporate governance promulgated in many European countries during the past years typically do not mention taxation explicitly.
The author would like to thank Martin Gelter for his valuable assistance.
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References
See RATHENAU, Vom Aktienwesen — Eine Geschäftliche Betrachtung (1917); HAUSSMANN, Vom Aktienwesen und vom Aktienrecht (1928). Rathenau believed that the interests of long-term stockholders, managers and the public where largely coherent and had to be protected from the interests of short-term speculators. For a historical overview see e.g. GROßMANN, Unternehmensziele im Aktienrecht, 141 et seq. (1980).
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See MARX/DALLMANN, Jahresabschlusspublizität mittelständischer Unternehmen, 59 Betriebs-Berater 929 (2004) (reporting that less than 5% of entities required to disclose accounts fulfill this duty). In Austria, the compliance rate is at about 75%, although some notable for prefer paying fines to disclosure.
SCHÖN, supra note 37, at 290–292.
MCCREEVY, Speech at the European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee, March 20, 2007, SPEECH/07/159.
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Nowotny, C. (2008). Taxation, Accounting and Transparency: The Missing Trinity of Corporate Life. In: Schön, W. (eds) Tax and Corporate Governance. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, vol 3. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77276-7_8
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