On the Key-Privacy Issue of McEliece Public-Key Encryption
The notion of key-privacy for encryption schemes was formally defined by Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai and Pointcheval in Asiacrypt 2001. This security notion has the application possibility in circumstances where anonymity is important. In this paper, we investigate the key-privacy issues of McEliece public-key encryption and its significant variants. To our best knowledge, it is the first time to consider key-privacy for such code-based public-key encryption, in the literature. We examine that the key-privacy is not available in the plain McEliece scheme, but can be achieved by some modification, with showing a rigorous proof. We believe that key-privacy confirmation will further magnify the application of McEliece and other code-based cryptography.
KeywordsRandom Oracle Random Oracle Model Goppa Code Cryptology ePrint Archive Choose Ciphertext Attack
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