Advertisement

On the Key-Privacy Issue of McEliece Public-Key Encryption

  • Shigenori Yamakawa
  • Yang Cui
  • Kazukuni Kobara
  • Manabu Hagiwara
  • Hideki Imai
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4851)

Abstract

The notion of key-privacy for encryption schemes was formally defined by Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai and Pointcheval in Asiacrypt 2001. This security notion has the application possibility in circumstances where anonymity is important. In this paper, we investigate the key-privacy issues of McEliece public-key encryption and its significant variants. To our best knowledge, it is the first time to consider key-privacy for such code-based public-key encryption, in the literature. We examine that the key-privacy is not available in the plain McEliece scheme, but can be achieved by some modification, with showing a rigorous proof. We believe that key-privacy confirmation will further magnify the application of McEliece and other code-based cryptography.

Keywords

Random Oracle Random Oracle Model Goppa Code Cryptology ePrint Archive Choose Ciphertext Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Bellare, M., Boldyreva, A., Desai, A., Pointcheval, D.: Key-Privacy in Public-Key Encryption. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 566–582. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Bellare, M., Desai, A., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 26–45. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random Oracles are Practical: A Paradigm for Designing Efficient Protocols. In: 1993 ACM Conf. Computer and Communications Security, pp. 62–73 (1993)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Courtois, N., Finiasz, M., Sendrier, N.: How to Achieve a McEliece-Based Digital Signature Scheme. In: Boyd, C. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248, pp. 157–174. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Halevi, S.: A Sufficient Condition for Key-Privacy. Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/005 (2005)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Kobara, K., Imai, H.: Semantically Secure McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystems-Conversions for McEliece PKC. Public Key Cryptography, pp. 19–35 (2001)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    McEliece, R.J.: A Public-Key Cryptosystem Based on Algebraic Coding Theory. Deep Space Network Progress Rep. (1978)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Niederreiter, H.: Knapsack-type Cryptosystems and Algebraic Coding Theory. Prob. of Control and Inf. Theory 15(2), 159–166 (1986)zbMATHMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Nojima, R., Imai, H., Kobara, K., Morozov, K.: Semantic Security for the McEliece Cryptosystem without Random Oracles. In: WCC 2007, pp. 257–268 (2007)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Shoup, V.: Sequences of Games: a Tool for Taming Complexity in Security Proofs. Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2004/332 (2004)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shigenori Yamakawa
    • 1
  • Yang Cui
    • 2
  • Kazukuni Kobara
    • 2
  • Manabu Hagiwara
    • 2
  • Hideki Imai
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Chuo UniversityJapan
  2. 2.Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science & Technology (AIST)Japan

Personalised recommendations